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D o s s i e r
Restrictiveness of discourse about evaluations 
of science
Within the media, and in political and so-
ciological discourse, evaluations of science are 
considered to be both the expression and engine 
of a comprehensive deprofessionalization of 
the academic profession. The introduction of 
regularly conducted performance evaluations by 
policy makers is just the latest in a series of crisis 
diagnoses that has a long history (Altbach 1980 ; 
Clark 1989 ; Enders 1999 ; Musselin 2007). The 
reasons for this are many and varied. They range 
from a generalized loss of trust in the capacity 
of the sciences to organize themselves (Weingart 
2005), to the need to allocate scarce research 
funds on the basis of evidence (“evidence-based 
policy”), to the triumph of new public manage-
ment, a “Weltanschauung” whose origins lie 
outside the realm of science (Power 1997). “Its 
message : replace the old regime, dominated by 
a state-regulated profession, with a new regime, 
dominated by a market- and state-driven organi-
zation” (Schimank 2005). The deprofessionaliza-
tion thesis encompasses three of the academic 
profession’s existential dimensions : 
- “a reduction in academic self-governance” 
(Schimank 2005 : 365), because exogenous 
stakeholders gain in inluence through evalu-
ation processes that involve the application of 
non-scientiic criteria ; 
- “a decline in collegiality” (Martin and Whitley 
2010 : 73), because evaluations strengthen “epis-
temic elites” that assert their own interests at the 
expense of their colleagues’ ; 
- “a retreat from case-specific evaluation” 
(Oevermann 2005 : 47), because formalized, 
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quantiied, and standardized indicators increas-
ingly become relevant for making decisions in 
evaluations. 
But, this multidimensional deprofessionalization 
thesis gives too little consideration to the concrete 
ways in which the evaluated and evaluating 
scientists act, interpret and formulate judgments 
within the evaluation process. These parties are 
still the principal actors in evaluations of science, 
and thus have considerable freedom in interpre-
ting and shaping these processes. What in fact 
emerges, when the microlevels of evaluation 
processes are considered, is that scientists do not 
react passively to evaluation processes (Leisyte 
et al. 2010), instead bringing their own values, 
standards, and expectations to bear on the process 
and thereby structuring it. Through this, they 
attempt to relate this externally initiated process 
to their own value system.
 
Our microanalytical study, conducted in the 
context of an international comparative research 
project1, shows that scientists do not view evalua-
tions solely as external performance monitoring,
 but also interpret it as a form of collegial consul-
tancy. Therefore, evaluations always involve both 
the quality control (assessment) of and improve-
ment of quality (consultancy) at scientiic insti-
tutes. This perspective, which is very important 
for scientists, contradicts the deprofessionaliza-
tion thesis and underlines the second function of 
evaluation, which is present in every process to 
a greater or lesser extent. This aims to improve 
the quality of research institutes in addition to 
monitoring performance. 
Quality improvements and performance monito-
ring do, however, necessitate different modes of 
action and are thus in conlict with one another. 
Whereas a productive learning process aiming 
to improve quality presupposes the “collegial 
consultancy” mode, eficient performance moni-
toring relies on “sanctioning evaluation”. 
Taking the German Leibniz Association’s (chap-
ter 3) evaluation process as an example, we inves-
tigate the question of how the tension between a 
consultancy focus and a potentially consequential 
performance assessment is negotiated within an 
evaluation process. Or, to put it another way : 
(How) is consultancy possible within an evalu-
ation context ? 
In selecting the Leibniz Association’s evaluation 
process, we have selected a type of evaluation 
that is used in many countries. At the heart of 
the process is an interactive site visit to the 
scientiic institutes being evaluated by a team 
of evaluators. The evaluators ultimately issue 
recommendations to science policy makers and 
the respective institutes (see also Röbbecke and 
Simon 2001). It is simultaneously also a form of 
audit with potentially far-reaching consequences 
that include the closure of the institute. Tensions 
are therefore written into the process. 
The structural tension between evaluation and 
consultancy will firstly be theoretically ex-
plored, and then reconstructed in the Leibniz 
Association’s evaluation process guidelines, the 
evaluated institutes’ preparations, the evalua-
tors’ ways of interpreting, acting, and reaching 
judgments, and inally in the ways in which the 
institutes’ react to the evaluation results. Finally, 
we will present two arguments for the opening 
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of research and discourse about evaluations of 
science : the role of scientists and their value 
systems within evaluation processes once again 
be strongly considered, which is why an analysis 
of the microstructures of evaluation is necessary. 
The structural tension between consultancy 
and assessment2
Why does a structural tension emerge, when 
evaluations wish to both assess and advise ? 
Evaluation is indeed a cognitive process, which 
is carried out a countless number of times 
daily. Evaluations in the form of assessments of 
science are, however, a special case that one might 
compare to a school exam. These are institution-
ally mandated processes that do not take place 
every day and have consequences for the future. 
Therefore, the situation must be made explicit in 
the form of criteria that are as clear as possible. 
This situation opposes two asymmetrical roles to 
each other. On one hand, the party being evalua-
ted has not requested the evaluation, and cannot 
avoid the evaluation or ignore its results. On the 
other, there is an evaluator who has been accorded 
the authority to make decisions. This authority 
is based on presumably superior knowledge, 
clear evaluation criteria, and a distanced, or even 
neutral, external perspective. The evaluator is 
trusted to differentiate between good and bad per-
formance (Buchholz 2008). This authority is also 
institutionally safeguarded, which means that the 
evaluator is invested with power. The evaluations 
have institutionally anticipated consequences and 
are not open to discussion ; just as school grades 
determine whether a student may proceed to the 
next class or what career opportunities they might 
have, institutional evaluations determine the fu-
ture of a research institute. The basic conditions 
that must be fulilled for this communicative 
situation are that the subject of the evaluation is 
complete and clearly describable, and that there 
are deined, usually scalable evaluation criteria. 
An ideal typical consultancy situation differs 
in many respects from an assessment. Consul-
tancy does also presuppose a decision-making 
problem, and is not possible without knowledge 
and assessment of the problem. But, a consul-
tancy situation is triggered by a decision-making 
problem on the part of the advice-seeking party, 
when he/she asks: “What do you think ?”. What 
follows is a natural rather than institutionally 
forced differentiation between the roles of the 
perplexed seeker of advice and the advisor, who 
is (presumably) equipped with helpful additional 
knowledge. The person may have his/her own 
criteria system, however, in order to be helpful 
this must be brought to bear on the advice seeker’s 
problems. Consultancy situations are apparent 
through a distinction between advice and its ac-
ceptance, between words and deeds (Fuchs 2004). 
The decision whether to accept advice within a 
consultancy situation remains with the advice 
seeker, whereas in an assessment situation it is 
made by the evaluator. 
Voluntary participation, trust, and openness can 
be considered the central preconditions for a con-
sultancy situation. The advisor/consultant should 
feel free to provide the advice that a particular 
situation calls for – he/she cannot be forced to 
provide any one speciic piece of advice. The 
inverse is also true – a party cannot be forced to 
seek advice. The aim of a consultancy situation 
is that it produces something that the seeker of 
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advice can act on. For this to happen, what is 
discussed must be integrated into the advice 
seekers own value system, a degree of conviction 
that cannot be externally imposed. This requires 
complete trust that the advisor is acting in the 
best interests of the advice seeker – “disinter-
estedness and good will” is how Schützeichel 
and Brüsemeister (Schützeichel and Brüsemeier 
2004 : 277) refer to it.
In a pure assessment, the point, from the perspec-
tive of the party being assessed, is to convince 
the reviewers by any means necessary, as a lot 
rides on the conclusion that is drawn. In the end, 
the grades signal performance and will not be 
questioned afterwards. It is therefore rational 
to employ strategies that could improve these 
grades, including deceit and fraud. This is not 
the case in a consultancy situation. Both parties 
must approach the situation in the spirit of mutual 
openness. The situation requires the conviction 
that openness, and not deceit or fraud, helps the 
advice seeker. 
When evaluation and consultancy are interwoven 
in one process this is naturally associated with 
tension. There are nevertheless many situations 
where this combination is institutionalized3 –, and 
the evaluation of science is one of them. Institu-
tional research evaluations are politically initiated 
and the processes are to a large extent politically 
determined. The points of departure and goals are 
to inform decisions on funding allocation. The 
evaluator’s decision affects the way the institute 
is perceived, and in extreme cases it may have 
implications for the institute’s continued exis-
tence. This makes the observation that colleagues 
will encounter each other “within” evaluation 
processes and use communicative forms of col-
legial consultancy all the more interesting. In the 
analysis that follows, we are therefore concerned 
with how this tension between evaluation and 
consultancy becomes evident, how it is dealt with, 
and what consequences emerge from it. 
The evaluation procedure of the German 
Leibniz Association
In the German scientiic establishment, there 
are four scientiic research organizations that, 
alongside the universities, play a important role 
in conducting research. These are the Max Planck 
Society, the Fraunhofer Gesellschaft, Helmholtz 
Association and the Leibniz Association. In the 
Leibniz Association there are 87 non-university 
research institutes with a variety of disciplinary 
focuses. Evaluations for these institutes have 
existed for a long period of time due to the par-
ticular way they are funded. These institutes are 
jointly funded by both the federal government and 
state governments and the purpose and necessity 
of this funding is regularly examined. This type of 
evaluation was developed by the German Science 
Council and was adopted by the Leibniz Associa-
tion and other evaluation agencies. The fact that 
the institutes are evaluated regularly, every seven 
years, distinguishes the Leibniz Association’s 
procedures from others. 
 
A visit to the institute in question, the so-called 
site visits, are at the heart of the Leibniz Associa-
tion’s evaluation process. In preparation for this, 
the institute prepares a report in advance about 
itself. The visits are a day and a half in length and 
consist of a presentation by the institute directors 
to the entire team of evaluators, departmental 
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visits, discussions with employees without the 
presence of the management, a meeting with 
the administrative heads, and a discussion with 
selected partners.   
This type of process, which focuses particularly 
on direct interaction between evaluators and 
evaluees, is common at an international level. The 
Standard Evaluation Protocol in the Netherlands 
and the university evaluations by the French 
Evaluation Agency for Research and Higher 
Education (AERES) function in a similar way. 
Other systems do not allow any interaction be-
tween the evaluating and the evaluated researcher. 
For instance, the Research Assessment Exercise 
(RAE) in the UK and the Quality Review of the 
Australian National University (ANU) analyzes 
documentation in a system that is principally 
based on grading publications.4
So, in comparison with the other evaluation 
methods in use, this method should particularly 
emphasize the tensions between consultancy and 
evaluation. Direct interaction with the aim of 
formulating recommendations should encourage 
the development of a consultancy situation. The 
evaluators are peers that have been assembled 
in an evaluation team based on the institute’s 
particular proile and reach judgments based on 
the speciics of each case : “Peer reviewers are 
responsible for selection, evaluation and, if nec-
essary, amendment of the criteria, depending on 
the related scientiic community and mission of 
the institution” (Leibniz-Association 2007). Inter-
action has great importance within this process. 
At the same time, this method is also a procedure 
intended to gather information for making fun-
ding allocation decisions based on a “standard 
list of criteria” (Leibniz-Association 2007). A 
report is composed about the site visit. The work 
of the evaluation committee concludes with the 
submission of a report. The institute then has an 
opportunity to respond in a written statement. 
Both documents are submitted to the Senate of 
the Leibniz Association, which then makes a 
recommendation to the Joint Science Conference 
(Gemeinsame Wissenschaftskonferenz), which 
has overall responsibility in these matters. This 
method, therefore, investigates whether an insti-
tute meets standardized criteria and is deserving 
funding. 
The method makes it possible to interpret 
evaluations as both collegial consultancy and 
performance assessment. The question is, how 
do the participants, both the evaluated and the 
evaluators, interpret the situation – how do they 
deal with the tension between consultancy and 
assessment ? 
How an institute prepares for evaluations
In preparing for an evaluation, an institute has 
two important tasks to complete : the documents 
must be prepared in time, and preparations for 
the site visit must be made as far as content and 
organization is concerned. There are countless 
decisions, both large and small, associated with 
these tasks, from content questions such as which 
research units should be the central focus, or what 
should be portrayed as the institute’s specialism, 
down to organizational questions about what 
poster should be displayed in what room and 
what food should be prepared. The process of 
answering these questions is shaped by the ten-
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sion between consultancy and assessment associ-
ated with this process. 
What emerges above all else is that all of the 
participants in an institute are aware that it is an 
evaluation, or even an examination, and that a lot 
is at stake for the institute in question. As a result 
of this, strategic behavior is also evident, such as 
pleasing the evaluators and ensuring as host that 
you are showing your best side. This includes 
cleaning up, because one doesn’t want a “railway 
station atmosphere, having pleasant surroun-
dings does create a different atmosphere” (Bock5 
4696) or effective event management : “because 
you only have to think of what you have to do 
when you are preparing for a wedding [laughs], to 
make sure everything works out.” (Dittmer 401).
So, strategic behavior does play a role in the 
preparations for a site visit. But it is also clear that 
the institution’s representatives expect more from 
the evaluation than just an examination on a given 
day. The production of preparatory documents in 
fact becomes part of an all-encompassing process 
of self-understanding. In all analyzed institutes 
the preparation process requires at least a year. 
It involves both compiling a summary of output, 
and summarizing and examining the institute’s 
structure. As a consequence the evaluation pro-
cedure is seen much more as a kind of forced 
organizational consultancy. Thus, one deputy 
institute director rated the evaluation process as 
positive nonetheless, precisely because it does 
not just focus on past performance but also looks 
at future prospects. In order to develop these 
prospects, a two-day workshop with selected 
staff members was organized at the behest of the 
scientiic advisory board. This workshop “was 
deinitely a preparation for the future and for the 
evaluation” (Müller 91). These internal processes 
of self-understanding go and above and beyond 
strategic preparations, because the identity of 
the institute is itself up for debate : “That was 
exciting, I think the institute learned a lot about 
itself also” (ibid. : 130). In this case, a new di-
rection for the institute even emerged from these 
intense discussions (connecting policy-oriented 
and pure research), which was established in the 
relevant area. The evaluators could then consider 
it as an object for consultancy. “In this case it 
really was all about the direction that the institute 
should take, and there was one camp that was 
saying,[…] we’ve done enough pure research, 
[…] but now our mission is advising policy, come 
hell or high water. […] And the other camp was 
saying, if we go in this direction […] we won’t 
be playing to the strengths that made the [evalu-
ated institute] great. […] And it was just a long 
discussion that went on for months and at some 
point the boss made his decision and said ok, 
that’s it now.” (ibid. : 187)
This example demonstrates quite clearly that 
preparations for evaluations are not just about 
giving the institute a new coat of paint, in the 
sense of well-formulated texts with a professional 
layout. If one assumes that in an evaluation the 
only thing that matters are the results, then this 
tactic would be completely rational. But the 
evaluation was “let into” the institute because 
the situation was also interpreted as a form of 
consultancy. The team of evaluators is also a 
group of colleagues, from whom one expects to 
receive constructive feedback. Hence, underly-
ing assumptions are rigorously questioned in the 
preparatory phase, much more carefully than if 
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it was exclusively about drawing up documents. 
And decisions were made. The one-day event that 
is the evaluation forces the making of decisions 
about questions that have probably been a latent 
undercurrent to the institute’s work for some time. 
The consequences of these decisions, which will 
at irst only appear on paper, depend on how the 
evaluation proceeds. The question of how the 
evaluators interpret the situation – as consultancy 
or evaluation – is crucial here. 
Reviewers in action
During site visits, evaluators are charged with 
assessing the institute’s performance and making 
recommendations as to whether the institute is 
still worthy of funding and how its work can be 
improved. So, they advise both science-policy 
authorities and the evaluated institute. This con-
stellation gives rise to a tense set of relations, in 
which loyalties become blurred. How do evalua-
tors position themselves in this kind of situation, 
which has been characterized by Uwe Schimank 
(2004) as being a drastic transition from collegial 
“tact” to “treachery” because “the advisor advises 
the advised how to deal with third parties that 
are also the advisor’s professional colleagues” ? 
Based on accounts by evaluators on why they 
participate in evaluations in the irst place, we 
can assume that they feel a primary duty to the 
scientiic community and to a lesser extent to 
science-policy authorities. They see the evalua-
tion as part of scientiic self-monitoring that one 
should do in any case. It is, in fact, “[…] a ser-
vice that we should provide because it is part of 
the job of science […] to do something positive 
serving science.” (Nunzinger 5). An expectation 
on the part of evaluated parties to receive support 
with as little criticism as possible is unsuitable 
for this, as is delivering devastating criticism 
without any suggested solutions. Constructive 
criticism is instead the most effective means of 
completing their job as consultants : “That is the 
important thing about evaluations, what’s the use 
of an evaluation if you don’t get any criticism 
at the end of it all, it would really be pointless 
then if you do not get any help for your ongoing 
work – support might be a better way of putting 
it” (Dallmeier 1056). 
The search for critical points serves to diagnose 
problems and formulate constructive recom-
mendations, and structures the actions of the 
evaluator in the evaluation process. Identifying 
critical points within the context of evaluations 
is however a particularly challenging process. 
After all, they receive documents, participate in a 
tightly scheduled program of events and interact 
with staff members who have rehearsed every-
thing in advance and eliminated any obstacles to 
get support from the evaluators. The evaluators 
encounter a structurally inconvenient situation, 
given their role as consultants, as performance 
and not problems are presented. Therefore, 
evaluators themselves are required to uncover 
problems in what is a time-consuming multistage 
process : 
 
1. Uncovering problems individually : Evaluators 
get their irst impression about the institute as a 
whole from the documents submitted. They refer 
back to “very speciic standards in their head” 
(Troemmel 353) and a general knowledge of 
the ield and its typical challenges and problems 
(Barlösius 2008). Using understandings of nor-
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mality – such as the particularities of the scientiic 
topic, typical career problems, the institutional 
embedding of the institute and expected publi-
cation performance or qualiication times – the 
heterogeneous information sources are “read 
very selectively” (Troemmel 54). Deviations, 
missing explications, or textual inconsistencies 
provide an opportunity for questions, criticisms, 
and the search for possible improvements. Pro-
blems, therefore, must irst be hermeneutically 
reconstructed, because they are not explicated 
in the documents. 
2. Collective problem stabilization : Before the 
active site visit begins, these initial impressions 
are collected by the evaluation committee and 
are tested within the team for their robustness. 
A very general communicative mechanism 
is central to this : “if nobody takes it up [the 
evaluators comment] then it is dead” (Troemmel 
226).  Individual comments may be supported 
by others or contested and be strengthened or 
weakened and thus successful stand the test or 
not. Using these kinds of discursive processes, a 
consensual impression is developed of whether 
the evaluation will be more or less problematic. 
Given that the closure of an institute is only a 
last resort, one element of the evaluators’ dual 
role tends to be stronger : “This ended up going 
much more strongly in the direction of consultant 
than auditor over the course of the [evaluation]” 
(Deichmann 430). The tension between both 
poles of the evaluator role does not, however, 
simply vanish : “So it’s a combination, because 
advising is too optional, as if you can do with my 
advice what you want” (Notter 117).
3. Interactive problem testing : Direct interac-
tion with members of the institute during the site 
visit ultimately serves to further inspect whether 
the impression that the team of evaluators col-
lectively got from the written document can be 
tallied with practice in the institute. The standard 
is : “The papers [must] conirm what the people 
say.” Precise observation of the ways in which 
institute acts and answers give the evaluators a 
less window-dressed reference point for making 
their judgments because “some nonverbal indica-
tors” (Troemmel 449) come into play. In doing 
this, evaluators go above and beyond a simple 
performance assessment, because they see com-
munication about problems and a realistic self-
assessment as beneicial, even though strategic 
behavior and highlighting performance might be 
expected : “When they […] admit a problem that 
is basically also an indicator that they are going 
in the right direction and that they have a realis-
tic self-image” (Fissler 864). Being open about 
problems and having a realistic self-image are the 
basic conditions that must be fulilled if evalua-
tors are to be able to advise. These preconditions 
may not, however, be fulilled, if evaluators irst 
have to check whether these self-descriptions 
correspond with reality, and dig up problems. 
A consultancy focus on the part of evaluators is 
therefore in conlict with exam-like performance 
assessment in evaluations. 
4. Public communication of problems : Only at the 
end of the site visit is it decided which observa-
tions will be adopted by the evaluation committee 
and be made public as intersubjectively shared 
collective judgments, in the form of “recom-
mendations”. In principle, a more intense version 
of the above-described discursive mechanism is 
repeated, in that suggestions from other evalua-
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tors must be accepted and thus conirmed. This 
is because, for one, the report is now intended 
for science-policy authorities that could draw un-
wanted conclusions from tough criticism. This is 
also because binding action orders will be drawn 
up on the basis of these “recommendations” as 
soon as they are set down in writing, and their 
implementation will be checked in the next evalu-
ation. Therefore, evaluators place great value 
formulating their results. The tone is praising
and rough edges are smoothed so that “certain 
things are only included in a very indirect form” 
(Kunst 227). The tension between collegial con-
sultancy and assessment is thus continued when 
recommendations are formulated. Clear language 
would be more beneicial for giving advice, were 
it not for the fact that direct sanctions are asso-
ciated with it. 
Based on the evaluators’ ways of behaving 
and interpreting, it can be seen that this type of 
evaluation is far removed from a impersonal, 
interpretation-free explicitly procedure-driven 
“mechanical objectivity” (Daston and Galison 
2007 ; Porter 1995). Uncovering problems and 
providing solutions and advice to the evaluated 
institutes are social processes that rely on interac-
tive rules (Lamont 2009 ; Lamont et al. 2009), 
discursive mechanisms and interpretive compe-
tencies. But how, then, do the institutes interpret 
the evaluation process and results ?
How an institute responds
The evaluators therefore understand themselves 
overwhelmingly as consultants to the evaluated 
institutes. The institutes also emphasize this role 
during the “site visits” : “[It] was because the 
evaluators were consistently very constructive, of 
course there were some that had their own agenda 
or their own particular interests, but despite 
this I have to say, it was extremely constructive” 
(Dagendorf 196). 
The way they deal with the evaluation report 
shows that the institutes interpret the results both 
as assessment and as consultancy, and, in keeping 
with this, integrate this into their action strategies. 
As one would expect in the assessment mode, the 
results and recommendations must be interpreted 
as binding action orders to the institute, which, if 
not followed, may result in serious consequences 
up to and including the closure of the institute. As 
consultancy instruments, the evaluation results 
are interpreted as an information basis for appro-
priate action, the strategy for which lies largely 
in the hands of institute actors. 
As the preparations have already shown, their 
way of dealing with the results of evaluations is 
not purely strategic in nature. That would imply 
that the evaluations were (at best) only being 
used as a proof of quality that could be used 
in negotiations with ministries to get inancial 
assistance. That would also mean accepting 
and implementing recommendations without 
exception. The reactions of the institutes indi-
cate a different approach : evaluation results are 
used as an impetus for change, conirmation of 
development processes that have already been 
internally initiated and/or as validation from an 
external authority of their own plans. “Yes, that 
was a conirmation of the plans” (Ulbricht 12). 
“If we hadn’t gotten that from outside, […] there 
wasn’t an opportunity to push it through” (Xaver-
Unger 1625).
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The institutes use the evaluations as a form of 
organizational consultancy, even if they did not 
commission it themselves. The recommendations 
are relected upon earnestly and implemented, 
but not necessarily on a one-to-one basis, rather 
links to internal structural or content development 
processes that are already ongoing are sought : 
“They are generally not must-dos, they are pos-
sibilities that we can examine and see to what 
extent they can be implemented” (Dagendorf 43). 
In summary we can determine that not only the 
evaluators, but also the institute representatives 
accord evaluations a meaning that goes beyond 
a purely externally forced monitoring situation. 
The case speciicity, that is the focus on tasks, 
goals, problems, and future prospects for the 
research institute in question is what gives these 
evaluations added value : “[…] when it was not 
about just number of publications or third-party 
funding attracted, but about how issues such as 
knowledge transfer, supporting new researchers, 
policy advice etc. work, my impression is that the 
evaluators also succeeded very well in not just 
judging […] but also in justifying these very well” 
(Dagendorf 28).
The institutes not only really look for the evalua-
tors’ advice and take it up in internal discussions 
about the future of the institute ; they also use 
their observations, advice and recommendations 
as a validating authority for their own plans for 
institutional change. 
Conclusion and outlook
Based on the fact that evaluations of science are 
externally initiated and organized systems of 
justiication, the dominant discourse often draws 
far-reaching conclusions about the dominance of 
external quality criteria and standards (deined 
by science policy), and a deprofessionalization 
of the scientiic profession. When the microlevel 
is considered it is apparent that evaluations are 
not at all exclusively considered as “external 
control” but rather also as collegial feedback. The 
evaluators’ self-understandings are not those of 
auditors ; they see their task as a service to the 
profession. The institutes’ preparations go far 
beyond strategic calculation and the connections 
at the level of content are sought in the results. 
These indings should also provide impetus for 
a new orientation in research on evaluations of 
science. The ways in which scientists engage with 
evaluations of science should be more strongly 
considered than thus far. At present, there is a 
tendency in research on evaluations of science 
to hastily associate new institutional frameworks 
with comprehensive changes in the functional 
logic of science. In order to better understand the 
mechanisms by which science policy instruments 
affect the organization and production of science, 
an analysis of microstructures should be consid-
ered to close gaps in the sociology of science. 
Only in this way will it become apparent that, 
for example, the principle of collegiality cannot 
simply be replaced by either the mechanisms of 
competition, the inluence of an evaluator elite or 
by formalized evaluation procedures. 
That does not by any means imply that evalua-
tions have no influence on the type and 
methods of scientiic evaluation, its structures and 
organization forms, and scientists’ professional 
self-understandings. Our analysis cannot make 
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any irm statements about the possible long-
term consequences. Researching the effects of 
evaluations of science on the speciic ways that 
both evaluating and evaluated scientists react 
would be a useful research perspective in this 
sense, and would thus make a new contribution 
to the discussions about the deprofessionalization 
of the academic profession and the impact and 
“triumph” of new public management in science. 
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Le discours actuel sur les évaluations institutionnelles 
de la recherche s’est construit autour d’une thèse 
dominante : en tant que contrôle de la performance 
initié par l’extérieur, les évaluations sont considérées 
comme l’expression, et le moteur, d’une déprofession-
nalisation globale de la profession académique. Les 
évaluateurs comme les  chercheurs évalués supposent 
qu’ils devront ajuster leurs systèmes de valeurs et 
d’évaluation à des critères externes. Notre analyse 
empirique des procédures d’évaluation à un niveau 
microsociologique se distance de cette thèse, et montre 
que les valeurs centrales de la profession académique 
persistent, et continuent à structurer la prise de décision 
et les actions de celle-ci. Une de ces valeurs stipule 
que les évaluations ne sont pas seulement au service 
du contrôle de la performance et de la sanction, mais 
qu’elles apportent les conseils de collègues. Mais 
comment le conseil est-il possible dans un contexte 
de contrôle de la performance, dont les conséquences 
sont potentiellement graves ? Nous répondons à cette 
question en analysant les décisions et les actions 
d’évaluateurs, et de chercheurs évalués, dans le cadre 
de la procédure d’évaluation des instituts de recherche 
allemands de l’Association Leibniz.
Abstract
The current discourse on institutional research evalua-
tions has been shaped by a dominant thesis. As an 
externally initiated form of performance monitoring, 
evaluations are considered to be both the expression 
of and drivers of a comprehensive deprofessional-
ization of the academic profession. Both evaluating 
and evaluated researchers assume they will have to 
adjust their value and evaluation systems in keeping 
with external benchmarks. Our empirical analysis of 
evaluation processes at a microlevel contrasts with 
this thesis, and shows that the academic profession’s 
central values persist, and continue to structure the 
ways in which the profession makes decisions and acts. 
One of these values is that evaluations should not just 
serve to monitor performance and sanction, but instead 
provide collegial consultancy and feedback. But how 
is consultancy possible in a performance-monitoring 
context whose consequences are potentially serious? 
We address this question by analyzing the decisions 
and actions of evaluating and evaluated researchers 
in the context of the German Leibniz Association’s 
evaluation procedure.
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